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Abstract
This paper provides a tractable empirical framework to analyze rm behavior in a
dynamic oligopoly when demand is declining over time. I modify Fudenberg and Tirole
(1986)s model of exit in a duopoly with incomplete information to a model that can be
used in an oligopoly, and combine this with an auxiliary entry model to address the initial
conditions problem. I estimate this model with panel data on the U.S. movie theater
industry from 1949 to 1955, using variations in TV di¤usion rates across households,
market structure before the exit game starts, and other market characteristics to identify
the parameters in the theaters payo¤ function and the distribution of unobservable xed
costs. Using the estimated model, I measure strategic delays in the exit process due to
oligopolistic competition and incomplete information. The delay in exit that arises from
strategic interaction is 2.7 years on average. Out of these years, 3.7% of this delay is
accounted for by incomplete information, while the remaining 96.3% is explained by
oligopolistic competition.
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1 Introduction
Industries decline for various reasons. Some sectors are left behind by a new technology, while
others are pressured by severe competition from abroad. The U.S. steel industry during the
1960s and 1970s went through a severe consolidation phase. In the U.K. steel castings indus-
try, demand declined by 42% between 1975 and 1981. Current examples are also abundant.
In the last ten years, several industries experienced a sharp decline in industry revenue: wired
telecommunications carriers (-54.9%), mills (-50.2%), newspaper publishing (-35.9%), and ap-
parel manufacturing (-77.1%).1 Despite their declining trend, declining industries still have
an important role in the economy. Industries whose real output had shrunk more than 10%
during the period 2000-2010 accounted for approximately 27% of U.S. manufacturing output
in 2010.2
In response to declining demand, rms sequentially divest, merge into a bigger entity,
or exit from the market, causing the industry capacity to continue to decrease. For sev-
eral reasons, such a consolidation process could cause substantial ine¢ ciencies, especially in
concentrated industries. First, capacity reduction is a public good that should be provided
privately, so rms have an incentive to free-ride on competitorsdivestment. Second, because
rms do not have exact information about competitorsprotability or about the future de-
mand process, they have an incentive to wait to acquire more information before they act.
These factors can create an ine¢ ciently slow divestment process. Bordersbankruptcy in 2011
may be a good example of this. In the brick-and-mortar book retail industry, two big rms,
Barnes & Noble and Borders, faced severe competition from online book stores (especially
Amazon) since the early 2000s. These physical book retailers started to steal customers
from each other. Despite such a costly form of competition, their speed of divestment (i.e.,
closing stores) was very slow.34 They tried to outlast each other, as when one of them ex-
ited/divested, the prot of the other would increase at least for some period of time.5 As a
1See IBISWorld, May 2011, available at http://www.ibisworld.com/Common/MediaCenter/Dying%20Industries.pdf.
2Employment Projections Program by U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. I use the 2007 NAICS 3 digit-level.
3SeeUS News, January 10, 2011, available at http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/owchart/2011/01/10/why-
barnesnoble-is-thumping-borders.
4Bordersprot turned from positive to negative in 2006. Since then, it incurred losses until its bankruptcy
in 2011. The number of Borderssuperstores, however, decreased only marginally, from 528 in 2005 to 511
in 2009. See The Ann Arbor News, February 16, 2011, available at http://www.annarbor.com/business-
review/borders-bankruptcy-ann-arbor-books/.
5Wall Street rm Credit Suisse estimates that Barnes & Noble will take more than 50% of the business
that is up for grabs from Bordersstore closings. Almost 70% of the two retailersstores overlap, good news
for Barnes & Noble as it tries to pick up former Borders customers.(See Time, March 8, 2011, available at
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,2057760,00.html)
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result, the divestment process imposed costs on the whole industry.
While these divestment and consolidation processes are very common, the economic costs
of such processes are not well understood. In particular, the economic costs due to the
strategic interactions mentioned above have not been studied empirically in the literature,
mostly because of technical di¢ culties including non-stationary environments, the prevalence
of equilibrium multiplicity in dynamic games, and the initial conditions problem. This paper
addresses these di¢ culties and methodologically contributes to the literature. The main in-
novation is a tractable empirical framework for analyzing the economic costs of consolidation
that arise due to strategic interaction. I focus on the case in which rms make a binary
exit-stay decision.
As an example, I study the U.S. movie theater industry in the 1950s, when a drop in
demand caused the sequential exits of theaters from local oligopolistic markets. Figure 1
shows the total yearly theater attendance and the total number of indoor theaters from 1947
to 1960. The average attendance for the average theater declined severely during the period.
This decline in demand was mostly due to exogenous forces, such as the nationwide penetration
of TVs (Lev (2003) and Stuart (1976)). Figure 2 shows growth of the TV penetration rate
in the U.S. Accordingly, the total number of indoor movie theaters decreased by 35% in ten
years from the end of the 1940s.
Competition in the U.S. movie theater industry in the 1950s resembled a war of attrition.
In those days, costs were mostly xed and capacity adjustments were usually infeasible. Hence,
theaters responded to declining demand by leaving the market. Given localized demand and a
small number of movie theaters in each market, theaters considered their opponentsbehavior
when choosing an optimal exit time. Since each theater does not internalize increased prots
received by its competitors when exiting the market, oligopolistic competition leads to slower
sequential exits when compared to the coordinated exits that maximize the industrys prot.
In addition, theaters were unlikely to have exact information about competitorsprotability,
because the major part of a theaters prot depends on sales/costs from concession stands
and rent payments, which di¤er widely and in idiosyncratic ways across theaters and are
private information. Therefore, theaters learn about their competitorsprotability over time,
and may have incurred a loss while competing, in the hope that they could outlast their
competitors. Thus, strategic interaction could generate a signicant delay in the exit process.6
To quantify the delay in exit (and the resulting cost) due to theatersmotives to outlast
6There is another dimension in which strategic interaction could have non-trivial impacts on the consolida-
tion process. The non-cooperative nature of the game could result in an ine¢ cient order of exits; less e¢ cient
rms outlast more e¢ cient competitors. Ghemawat and Nalebu¤ (1985) demonstrate such a possibility theo-
retically.
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each other, the e¤ect of competition among theaters as well as their beliefs about competitors
needs to be inferred separately from the e¤ect of exogenous demand. For this purpose, I
modify Fudenberg and Tirole (1986)s model of exit in duopoly with incomplete information
to one that can be used in an oligopoly setting. At each instant, theaters choose whether to
exit or stay in the market. I assume each theater knows its own time-invariant xed cost but
not that of its competitors. Thus, from a theaters perspective there is benet of not exiting
the market, as there is some chance their competitors will exit instead, which increases their
prot. They compare this benet of waiting with the cost of waiting, which increases over
time. In equilibrium, theaters get discouraged and exit if competitors stay open long enough.
When one of the theaters exits, the remaining theaters revise their planned exit time and wait
until then. As a result, theaters exit sequentially, with the theater with the highest xed cost
leaving rst.
One major advantage of this framework is that the uniqueness result in Fudenberg and
Tirole (1986) is preserved in the N player game. Thus, for any set of parameters of the model,
there is a unique distribution of equilibrium exit times. Furthermore, as demonstrated in
Section 3, the cost of computing the equilibrium is low. As a consequence, I can take the full-
solution approach, which allows me to explicitly take theatersexpectations and unobservable
market-level heterogeneity into account.
I apply the proposed framework to theater-level panel data from the U.S. movie theater
industry, estimating theaterspayo¤ functions and the distribution of xed costs. I use TV
penetration rates, which vary across locations and time, to measure changes in demand. By
imposing the equilibrium condition, the model predicts the distribution of theatersexit times
for a given set of parameters and unobservables. I estimate the parameters by matching the
distribution predicted by the model with the observed distribution of exit times.
Identication of the model is possible because, in equilibrium, exit times are determined
by theatersexpectations about their competitorsbehavior as well as demand decline and
product market competition. Therefore, exit times are informative about all these factors. In
addition, I observe the number of theaters in each market before the war of attrition started.
Intuitively, the strategic delay is measured as follows. The market structure before the decline
in demand helps me to infer how theaters interact in the product market. Using exit behavior
in monopoly markets, I can infer how demand declines with TV penetration. With these
components, exit behaviors in a strategic environment (markets with more than one theater)
are implied from the model without asymmetric information. Then, the di¤erence between
these implied exit behaviors and data is attributed to the strategic delay in exit and the extent
of asymmetric information.
Using the estimated model, I quantify the e¤ect of strategic interaction on the consolida-
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tion process. To do so, I dene two benchmarks. First, if xed costs are common knowledge,
then in equilibrium, a theater exits the market at the exact time that its operating prot
becomes lower than its xed costs, implying that no theater incurs a loss. This is called the
complete information benchmark. The di¤erence in cumulative market prots between the
war of attrition and the complete information benchmark is dened as the cost of asymmetric
information. Second, I shut down the incentive to free-ride on competitorsexit and calcu-
late the path of theater exits that maximizes the industrys prot. I call this the regulator
benchmark, and the di¤erence in cumulative industry prots under the complete information
benchmark and the industry regulator case is dened as the cost of oligopolistic competition.
The delay in exit that arises from strategic interaction is 2.676 years on average. From
these years, 3.7% of this delay is accounted for by asymmetric information, while the re-
maining 96.3% is explained by oligopolistic competition. The resulting cost, measured by the
percentage di¤erence in cumulative market prots, is 4.9% in the median market. The cost of
oligopolistic competition accounts for 95.5% of this total cost, while the cost of asymmetric
information accounts for 4.5%.
The extent of delay due to asymmetric information di¤ers across di¤erent market struc-
tures. Specically, such delays are longer in markets with fewer competitors. For example, the
average delay in duopoly markets is 0.154 years (6.5% of the total delay in duopoly markets),
while the average across all markets is 0.099 years. For a given player, the probability of win-
ning the war of attrition, i.e., the probability of being a monopolist, is highest in a duopoly,
and therefore theaters have the greatest incentive to wait. Moreover, the increase in prots
when one competitor exits is highest in a duopoly, which also partly explains the di¤erence
in delay between the two cases. As the initial number of competitors gets large, competition
becomes closer to perfect competition, and hence motives to outlast competitors become less
signicant.
The cost of asymmetric information is larger in markets with a slow decline in demand.
Splitting the sample into markets with slow and fast decline based on the speed of TV di¤u-
sion, the median cost in slowly declining markets, measured by the percentage di¤erence in
cumulative market prots, is 0.83%, while the corresponding number for markets with fast
decline is 0.57%. The intuition is as follows. In markets with slow decline, the cost of waiting
increases slowly. On the other hand, the benet of waiting is still large because a winner of
the game can enjoy a higher prot over a longer period of time. These two factors prolong
the war of attrition. For example, in a counterfactual scenario in which demand is xed over
time, the average delay in exit due to asymmetric information becomes 1.059 years, which is
more than ten times as long as the original case. An example of such a situation would be
battles to control new technologies discussed by Bulow and Klemperer (1999), as demand in
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those industries is not declining. Consequently, large losses accumulate over time.
Related Literature
I use a full-solution approach to estimate the dynamic game with learning, exploiting the
uniqueness property of the game and simplicity of computation. In contrast, most papers
estimate a dynamic game using a two-step estimation method. Early papers that proposed
two-step estimation methods for dynamic Markov games include Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer
(2003), Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007), Pakes, Ostrovsky,
and Berry (2007), and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008). Recent empirical applications
using a two-step method include Ryan (2012), Collard-Wexler (2013), and Sweeting (2013).
In the rst stage of the two-step method, a policy function is calculated for every possible
state, which is di¢ cult in a non-stationary environment. Moreover, unobservable variables
(market-level heterogeneity and theatersprotability) play an important role in my model,
so the rst-stage estimation in the two-step method would not be consistent.
Schmidt-Dengler (2006) analyzes the timing of new technology adoption, separately es-
timating how it is a¤ected by business stealing and preemption. In the environment he
considers, the cost of adopting a new technology declines over time. One important di¤erence
is the source of ine¢ ciency in oligopolistic markets. In Schmidt-Dengler (2006), players can
delay competitorsadoption times by adopting before they do, even though such an adoption
time is earlier than the stand-alone incentive would suggest as optimal. Thus, this preemp-
tion motive hastens the industrys adoption of new technology. In the current study, there is
asymmetric information, so players have an incentive to delay their exit, hoping that they can
outlast their competitors, even if they are currently making a negative prot.
Klepper and Simons (2000) and Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) investigate the U.S. tire
industry, in which a large number of rms exited within a relatively short period of time.
They assume this market is competitive. In their model, innovation opportunities encourage
entry in the early stage of the industrys development. As the price decreases due to the new
technology, rms that fail to innovate exit. Competition a¤ects the devolution of the industry
through the market price. In comparison, in the movie theater industry during the relevant
period, competition was local, and hence strategic interactions among theaters should be taken
into account. Another important di¤erence is that the shakeout in the U.S. tire industry was
not due to declining demand.
A number of papers analyze rm exit (Fudenberg and Tirole (1986), Ghemawat and Nale-
bu¤ (1985, 1990)).7 I estimate a modied version of Fudenberg and Tirole (1986), which has
7Several papers, including Baden-Fuller (1989), Deily (1991), and Lieberman (1990) analyze empirically
the relationship between a rms characteristics and its exit (plant closing) behavior.
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asymmetric information between players that delays their exits. A model similar to Ghemawat
and Nalebu¤(1985), one without asymmetric information, is used for my counterfactual analy-
sis to evaluate the signicance of asymmetric information. Ghemawat and Nalebu¤ (1990)
consider a case in which rms can continuously divest their capacity in a declining industry.
While such a case is more sensible in many settings, as Section 2 will discuss, the current
application ts better into a case of binary exit/stay decisions.
Several recent papers analyze consolidation processes using a dynamic structural model.
Stahl (2012) uses the deregulation in the U.S. broadcast TV industry as an exogenous event
that led to signicant consolidation to estimate rmsbenets (increased revenue) and costs
of purchasing competitorsstations. Jeziorski (2013) develops a dynamic model of endogenous
mergers to estimate xed-cost e¢ ciencies of mergers in the U.S. radio industry. These two
papers quantify the cost reduction the merging rm achieves. On the other hand, Nishi-
waki (2010) develops and estimates an oligopolistic model of divestment using data from the
Japanese cement industry. With the estimated demand and cost parameters, he asks the
hypothetical question of what would have happened to social welfare if a merger in the data
had not been approved. An important di¤erence is that he considers a case without learning
and focuses on rmsdivestment processes and business stealing e¤ects.
This paper is related to the literature on all-pay auctions with incomplete information.
Krishna and Morgan (1997) analyze auction settings in which losing bidders also have to
pay positive amounts and examine the performance of these settings in terms of expected
revenues. Moldovanu and Sela (2001) study a contest with multiple unequal prizes with
asymmetric bidding costs. Bulow and Klemperer (1999) analyze a general game in which
there are N +K players competing for N prizes. My model can be considered as one variant
of this class of models with heterogenous costs/prizes of bidders, but it is di¤erent because
the value of the prize (operating prots) changes over time and is a¤ected by the number
of surviving players, which is endogenous. In addition, this paper is one of few empirical
applications of such models.
To the best of my knowledge, almost no paper in the literature estimates a dynamic game
with serially-correlated private values (a notable exception is Fershtman and Pakes (2010)).
Two di¢ culties arise in estimating such models. First, to account for theatersexpectations,
the entire history of the game should be included in the state space. It is di¢ cult to do so in the
framework of Ericson and Pakes (1995), which is commonly used in the literature. Second,
the initial conditions problem is more signicant with serially-correlated private values, as
players at the beginning of the sample period are selected samples. Because I account for
these factors, I can estimate a game with serially-correlated private values, in comparison to
much of the literature.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briey summarizes the U.S.
movie theater industry in the 1940s and 1950s. Section 3 modies the model of Fudenberg
and Tirole (1986) to be used in an oligopoly. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 discusses
my estimation strategy. Section 6 presents estimation results and simulation analysis. Section
7 concludes. All proofs are shown in the appendices.
2 Case Study: The U.S. Movie Theater Industry
The U.S. movie theater industry in the late 1940s and 1950s is a relevant case study for
the economic costs of consolidation. This subsection discusses the industry background and
underlying factors behind its declining demand. I focus on demand and exit behavior in the
classic single-screen movie theater industry.
After a big boom starting in the 1920s, the U.S. movie theater industry faced a severe
decrease in demand in the 1950s and the 1960s, primarily due to the growth of TV broad-
casting. In 1950, fewer than one out of ten households in the U.S. owned a TV set. By 1960,
however, almost 90% of households had a TV. In response, demand for theaters decreased.
Movie attendance declined most quickly in places where TVs were rst available, implying
that TV penetration caused a decline in demand. According to Stuart (1976), the addition
of a broadcast channel in the market caused an acceleration in the decline in movie theater
attendance. There were other factors that contributed to the decline in demand. Suburb
growth and motorization facilitated the growth of drive-in theaters, which in turn further
decreased demand for classic single-screen movie theaters.
Changes in government policy at the end of the 1940s also contributed to the downturn
in demand.8 Vertical integration among producers, distributors, and exhibitors had been
widespread until the late 1940s. The major movie producers (called the Hollywood majors9)
formed an oligopoly, and they had control over theaters through exclusive contracts and
explicit price management. They owned 3,137 of 18,076 movie theaters (70% of the rst-run
theatres in the 92 largest cities). The Paramount Decree (1946), however, put an end to this
vertical integration, resulting in the separation of those producers from their vertical chains
of distributors and exhibitors. For example, explicit price management by distributors was
prohibited. The government also mandated that the spun-o¤ theater chains would have to
further divest themselves of between 25% and 50% of their theater holdings.
The Paramount Decree created a more unstable and risky business environment for movie
8The gures and facts in this paragraph are from Chapter 6 of Melnick and Fuchs (2004).
9Majors in this era include the Big Five (Loews/MGM, Paramount, 20th Century-Fox, Warner Bros.,
and RKO) and the Little Three(Universal, Columbia, and United Artists).
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theaters. For example, movie producers no longer had a strong incentive to produce movies
year round. Furthermore, according to Lev (2003), the production companies started to regard
TV as an important outlet for their movies. In the era of vertical integration, producers had
an incentive to withhold their movies from TVs in the interests of their exhibitor-partners.
After divestment, however, movie theaters became just one of the customers for producers,
along with the TV companies.
Because of all of these factors, demand for incumbent movie theaters shrunk in an arguably
exogenous way. As shown in Figure 1, theater attendance started to decrease in 1949, and
kept declining mostly monotonically afterwards. Almost all theaters had only a single screen
in those days (e.g., the rst twin theater in the Chicago area opened in 1964), and their xed
investments were often heavily mortgaged. Therefore, they could not adjust capacity to deal
with declining demand. They could only bear the loss and stay open or exit the market. Thus,
the number of indoor movie theaters decreased with demand.
Figure 1 also shows that the decline in the number of indoor theaters was slower than the
decline in theater attendance. This slow divestment process is consistent with the argument
that capacity reduction is a public good so the industry tends to maintain excess capacity in a
declining environment. One way to further explore this di¤erence is to look at the relationship
between exits of incumbent theaters and market structure. Figure 3 shows the exit rate during
the sample period averaged by the initial number of competitors. As is clear from the gure,
the exit rate increases with the number of competitors. One possible explanation is that
theaters were trying to outlast their competitors in the declining environment. Since a few
theaters could still operate protably, each theater preferred to stay open as long as it expected
some competitors to exit early enough. If there are many competitors, it is highly unlikely
that a theater will be one of the few survivors at the end, so the theater may give up and exit
early. This situation ts nicely into the framework of a war of attrition. Thus, in this paper,
I use the framework of a war of attrition, exploiting the relationship between the number of
competitors and exit probability to analyze the exit behavior of movie theaters.
The structure of the U.S. movie theater industry changed signicantly in the 1960s, when
multiplex theaters emerged. This arguably changed the nature of competition. Once a theater
has multiple screens, it can potentially respond to a change in demand by, for example, closing
several screens. The structure of the industry became even more di¤erent and complicated
after the 1980s because of the advent of home videos/DVD and horizontal integrations by
big theater chains. Horizontal integration has become more prevalent over time. Nowadays,
ten nation-wide movie theater chains own 34% of indoor movie theaters and 58% of screens
in the U.S.10 In the 1940s and 1950s, however, such horizontal integration was much less
10See the website of the National Association of Theatre Owners at http://www.natoonline.org/.
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common.11 Considering these changes in the industry structure since the 1960s, I focus on
the late 1940s and 1950s.
It is di¢ cult to evaluate how much of rms information is privately observed. Theater-
specic demand is most likely common information between theaters, as the number of ad-
missions is easily observed. Prots from concession sales, however, which account for an
important part of total prot, are much harder to observe. Information about costs would
also tend to be private. First, the outside option or opportunity cost of a theaters owner is
di¢ cult to observe. Second, the theaters xed costs mainly come from rent payments, which
vary widely across theaters and are not easily observed by competitors. With unobserved
competitorscosts and sales, in an environment in which the industry demand is declining,
theaters could keep updating their beliefs about competitorsprotability over time.
3 The Model
In this section, I modify Fudenberg and Tirole (1986)s model of exit in a duopoly with
incomplete information to be used in an oligopoly.
3.1 Setup
There are N theaters, i = 1; :::; N; which play a game of exit in a market. The game starts at
t = 0 and time is continuous. At each instant, theaters decide whether to stay in or exit the
market. If more than one theater chooses to exit at t = 0; one of these theaters is randomly
chosen with equal probability and exits, and then the remaining N   1 theaters restart the
game at t = 0:12
While staying, theaters earn a common instantaneous prot of n (t) ; where n 2 f1; :::; Ng
is the number of currently active theaters in the market. Once a theater exits the market, it
cannot re-enter. When theater i exits, it receives an exit value (scrap value) of i; which is
privately observed by theater i at the beginning of the game. Note that i incorporates both
the value of exit (opportunity cost) that the theater would forgo by staying in and the xed
cost of production. The values i are drawn independently from the common distribution
G :

; 
! [0; 1] ; where 0 <  <  <1: Theaters discount the future at a common rate of r:
11Online Appendix D analyzes how important movie theater chains are in determining the exit process.
12This particular rule at t = 0 is introduced to avoid the problem of the non-existence of a pure strategy
equilibrium. It is possible in the case of N -player games that exiting immediately given opponents not doing
so is optimal for more than one player. In this case, a symmetric equilibrium does not exit. For the necessity
of this randomization device in N -player games and discussion, see Haigh and Cannings (1989), footnote 31
of Bulow and Klemperer (1999), and Argenziano and Schmidt-Dengler (2013).
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I use theater ito denote a theater with exit value i: I focus on symmetric perfect-Bayesian
equilibria.
I impose several restrictions on the payo¤ function and the distribution of :
Assumption 1 (i) n (t) decreases over time and converges to n for all n: (ii) For each
n = 2 ; :::;N ; n (t) < n 1 (t) for all t: (iii) limt!1N (t) > : (iv) 1 (0) < : (v) G
has a density g everywhere positive and absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue
measure.
The game proceeds as follows. At t = 0; each theater decides when to exit, conditional
on none of the competitors having exited by then. In Online Appendix A, I show that this
decision is equivalent to choosing to exit or to remain open at every instant. When one theater
exits, other surviving theaters revise their planned exit times based on the currently available
information, since now the instantaneous prot is higher and there is one less active theater in
the game. Thus, a strategy is a mapping from the state space to the real line (exiting time),
Ti : 
! [0;1] ; where 
 denotes the set of states detailed below.
Suppose that one theater exits at s > 0: The remaining theaters play a subgame. The
only information that each theater has obtained about its remaining opponents is the fact
that they have survived up until s: As I will show in Section 3.2, there exists the highest
possible value of  of surviving opponents, denoted by e; which is a su¢ cient statistic for the
history of the game up until s: For ease of exposition, I keep dependence of e on other factors
implicit. The state space consists of the number of survivors, the current time, the highest
possible exit value of surviving opponents, and the theaters own exit value. The domain of
the strategy is therefore given by 
 = N  R+ 

; 
  ;  ; where N = f1; :::; Ng : Let
T i be a set of strategies for is opponents and let T = (Ti; T i) :
To characterize the value of theaters, dene t ( i) = minj 6=ifTj(n; s;e; j)g: That is,
t( i) gives the earliest exit time of is competitors. Note that I make the dependence of
t on state variables and strategy implicit. If theater i chooses stopping time  when the
state variables are given by (n; s;e; i) and the other theaters follow strategy T i; the present
discounted value of is expected payo¤ is
V ( ; T i; n; s;e; i) = Pr(t( i)  ) Z 
s
n (t) e
 r(t s)dt+
i
r
e r( s)

+
Z
f ijt( i)<g
"Z t( i)
s
n (t) e
 r(t s)dt
+e r(t
( i) s)V (T; n  1; t( i);e0; i)i g( ij  e)d i:
where e0 is the highest possible exit value of surviving theaters at time t( i) and g( ij e) = Y
j 6=i
g(jjj  e):
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In other words, an n   1 player game is nested into an n player game, which is further
nested into an n+ 1 player game, and so on.
Denition 1 A set of symmetric strategies fT^i(n; s;e; i)gNi=1 with posterior beliefs g(j  e)
is a symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium if for all n 2 N ; s 2 R+; e 2 ;  ; and
i 2

; 

;
1. For all i and any strategy Ti;
V (T^i; T^ i; n; s;e; i)  V (Ti; T^ i; n; s;e; i);
and
2. For any opponent j, g(jjj  e) is given by
g(jj  e) = ( g(j)Pr(j2) ; j 2 
0; j =2 
where  is the set of types  that can survive on-equilibrium path.
3.2 The General Solution
This subsection characterizes the Bayesian equilibrium in an N -player game. The major
di¤erence between this game and Fudenberg and Tirole (1986)s duopoly game is that when
one player drops out, the game still continues. The following lemmata fully characterize
the necessary conditions of the Bayesian equilibrium in an N -player game. Since I focus
on symmetric equilibria, rm subscripts in strategy functions are omitted. All proofs are
presented in Online Appendix A.
Lemma 2 Assume n = N: Under Assumption 1, if T (n; 0; ; ) is the equilibrium strategy
in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, then (i) For all  2 n 1 (0) ;  ; T (n; 0; ; ) = 0. (ii)
T (n; 0; ; ) is continuous and strictly decreasing on (;n 1 (0)) : (iii) The inverse function
of strategy in terms of ; denoted as (t;n; 0; )  T 1(t;n; 0; ); is di¤erentiable on (0;1):
(iv) Its derivative is given by
0(t;n; 0; ) =   G((t;n; 0; ))
(n  1) g((t;n; 0; ))
"
(t;n; 0; )  n (t)
V (T; n  1; t;e0;e0)  (t;n; 0; )=r
#
; (1)
where e0 = (t;n; 0; ); with the boundary conditions
(0;n; 0; ) = n 1 (0) (2)
lim
t!1
(t;n; 0; ) = lim
t!1
n (t) : (3)
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The next lemma characterizes the equilibrium strategy for n < N: Let sn denote the time
when the n-player subgame starts. There are two cases to consider. First, the subgame still
starts at time zero; i.e., sn = 0: This is the case when one or more competitors exit at time
zero in the preceding subgame. Second, there is already selection in the preceding subgame;
i.e., sn > 0:
Lemma 3 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. First, assume 1 < n < N: If sn = 0; properties
(i)-(iv) in Lemma 2 hold. Next, assume sn > 0 and let 
 = (sn;n + 1; sn+1;en+1) and
t =  1n (
): Then, (i) There is no exit at t 2 (sn; t]: In addition, given that T (n; t; ; )
is the equilibrium strategy, (ii) T (n; t; ; ) is continuous and strictly decreasing in  on
(; ) : (iii) (t;n; t; )  T 1(t;n; t; ) is di¤erentiable on (t;1): (iv) Its derivative is
given by (1) and the boundary conditions are
(t;n; t; ) =  (4)
lim
t!1
(t;n; t; ) = lim
t!1
n (t) : (5)
Finally, assume n = 1: The exit time of the surviving theater is given by the solution to the
following single-agent problem:
T (1; s1;e1; ) 2 arg max
2[s1;1]
Z 
s1
1 (t) e
 r(t s1)dt+

r
e r( s1)

:
Proposition 4 Under Assumption 1, equations (1)-(5) constitute a symmetric Bayesian equi-
librium of the entire game.
I do not have a formal proof for existence. In the estimation, however, for any set of
parameters, I numerically nd the (t;n; sn;en) that satises equations (1), (2), and (3).13
Moreover, as Proposition 5 shows, if I nd a symmetric equilibrium, it is the unique symmetric
equilibrium.
Proposition 5 The symmetric equilibrium, if it exists, is unique.
The logic behind this result is the same as that of Fudenberg and Tirole (1986). Introducing
a positive probability that no theater has to exit brings the uniqueness. This is an attractive
feature of the model and is extremely important for the full-solution approach in estimation.
Finally, the following proposition bounds the policy function from below and above.
Proposition 6 0 < n (t) < (t;n; sn;en) < n 1 (t) for all n > 1 and t > sn:
13Online Appendix E provides the details for computing the solution to the di¤erential equation.
13
3.3 Intuition and Example
The intuition behind the solution can be easily understood by considering themarginal player.
For the marginal player i who is indi¤erent between dropping out at time t and staying until
time (t+ dt) and then dropping out, it follows that
Pr
0BB@
one of n  1 competitors
drops in [t; t+ dt]
conditional on survival until t
1CCA
"
V (T; n  1; t;e0;e0)  e0
r
#
dt| {z }
is payo¤ when one of competitors drops
=
he0   n (t)i dt| {z }
is cost of staying in
;
(6)
where e0 = (t;n; sn;en): Since the conditional probability that one of the n  1 competitors
drops out in [t; t+ dt] is given by f(  (n  1) g((t;n; sn;en))0(t;n; sn;en)=G((t;n; sn;en)))
dtg; rearranging (6) gives the di¤erential equation (1).
Thus, the di¤erential equation with boundary conditions fully characterizes the time path
of the marginal type and serves as a policy function. Figure 4 shows a typical duopoly case.
The policy function (t; 2; 0;1 (0)) gives a one-to-one mapping between the type space [; ]
and the space of exit time [0;1]: For example, starting the game from t = 0; a theater with
k makes a negative prot (or equivalently, the opportunity cost is higher than the operating
prot) from the beginning, which is represented by the vertical distance between 2 (0) and
k: Despite this being the case, theater k chooses to remain in the market in the hope that
its competitor will exit soon, because at that point the theater would earn 1 (t). If the
competitor has not dropped out by T (2; 0;1 (0) ; k) ; however, then theater k gives up
competing and exits.
To see how the game transitions from an n player to an n   1 player game, consider
the case of triopoly. Figure 5 shows a typical example. When no competitors have dropped
out, theaters follow the policy function (t; 3; 0;2 (0)): Assume that three theaters have
(i; j; k) and that k = max fi; j; kg : Following the policy function, theater k waits until
T (3; 0;2 (0) ; k) and then drops out. At this moment, the highest possible exit value in
the two-player game, denoted by e in the previous subsection, is given by k: Any theaters
with a higher exit value should have exited earlier in equilibrium. Now that there is one less
competitor, the instantaneous payo¤ jumps from 3 (t) to 2 (t) ; so any surviving players
are not making a negative prot. Thus, there will be no selection until the marginal playere gets hit by 2 (t) ; i.e., until t =  12 (e); when the marginal player just breaks even. Then,
selection restarts again. The time path of the marginal player in the two-player game is given
by (t; 2; 12 (k) ; k) and serves as a policy function.
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3.4 Computing the Equilibrium of the Model
For a given payo¤ function and exit values of theaters, I can simulate the game and compute
the equilibrium exit times. As the three-player example above illustrates, a general N player
game can also be solved sequentially, starting from solving (t;N; 0;N 1 (0)). The key to
the tractability is that the evaluation of V (T;N   1; t;e0;e0) with e0 = (t;N; 0;N 1 (0)) in
equation (1) is computationally simple. Since this is the value of entering the N   1 player
subgame for the worsttype implied by the equilibrium, it can be written as
V (T;N   1; t;e0;e0) = Z  1N 1(e0)
t
N 1(t0)e r(t
0 t)dt0 +
e0
r
e r(
 1
N 1(e0) t0):
That is, if a player is the worst type at the moment, then the value of entering the subgame is
simply the sum of the following two terms: the discounted sum of prots earned until N 1(t)
declines down to e and the discounted sum of exit values from time  1N 1(e0) on. Note that
these terms consist of the models primitives only. Thus, computing an equilibrium repeatedly
is feasible in my framework.14
Finally, I investigate the models predictions and the role played by asymmetric informa-
tion. In a duopoly, as demonstrated in Figure 4, the rst exit is delayed while the second exit
is not, compared to the case of complete information in which theaters exit as soon as their
prots become negative. Thus, exit times tend to cluster in the war of attrition relative to the
case of complete information. This holds for a general N player game when it comes to the
interval between the N -th and N   1th exit, since the last rm simply solves the monopoly
problem and never delays its exit.
What is less clear is about other intervals. In a triopoly, for example, consider the rst
and second exit times. In Figure 5, the delay of theater k is given by T (3; 0;2 (0) ; k) :
On the other hand, assuming that theater j is the next one to exit, its delay is measured
by T
 
2; 12 (k) ; k; j
    12 (j) : If this is smaller than T (3; 0;2 (0) ; k) ; then the two
exit times are closer to each other in a war of attrition than under complete information.
Intuitively, as time goes on, theaters learn more about their competitors. This reduces the
incentive to learn more about competitors. On the contrary, the increase in prot is larger
when the market changes from duopoly to monopoly, compared to when it changes from
triopoly to duopoly. Thus, whether the length of delay tends to be shorter as the game
proceeds is not determinate.
14Other models such as Ericson and Pakes (1995) are hard to compute, and hence are di¢ cult to use for a
full solution approach.
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4 Data
4.1 Data Source and Selection Criteria
The main data for this study come from The Film Daily Yearbook of Motion Pictures (1949,
1950, 1951, 1952, 1954, and 1955), which contains information on every theater that has ever
existed in the U.S.15 The dataset includes the name, location, number of seats, and type
(indoor, drive-in, etc.) of each theater.16 The data do not show the exact date of exit, so I
constructed the exit year in the following way. If a theater was observed in year t but not
year t+ 1, I assume that the theater exited sometime between years t and t+ 1.17
I assume that wars of attrition started in 1949, when demand started to shrink rapidly in
an exogenous way. I dene all the non-drive-in theaters that were open in 1949 as players in
the exit game. Theaters that entered after 1949 are treated as exogenous demand shifters.
While the focus of this analysis is on single screen theaters, theaters that entered after 1949
were brand-new, and sometimes equipped with luxurious concession stands and nicer seats.
There was certainly competition between classic single-screen theaters and these new theaters.
It is not unreasonable, however, to assume that the game I developed was played among old
theaters, and the entry/exit of new theaters was exogenous from the viewpoint of the old
theaters.
Movie theaters compete in local markets (Davis, 2005). In this paper, I dene a market
as a county. One big advantage of doing this is that data on demand shifters, such as TV
penetration and demographics, are at the county-level. One drawback of this market denition
is that the geographical area of some markets may be too large, because customers would not
drive for long distances to go to a movie theater. Another problem is that some counties
extend over many cities and contain hundreds of theaters (e.g., San Francisco county). To
alleviate these problems, I focus on markets (counties) with fewer than or equal to ten theaters
in 1949. Because of this selection, 313 markets out of 3,020 markets were dropped.
15The yearbook in 1953, unlike other years, does not provide a list of all movie theaters. Movie theaters in
Alaska are listed only in the 1949 Yearbook, so I exclude Alaska from the analysis.
16For location variables, the exact address is often missing. We do, however, know the name of the city
where the theater is/was located. The number of seats is often missing, too.
17Occasionally, a theater is observed in t; not observed in t+ 1; and observed again in t+ 2: In this example,
it could be the case that the theater did not exit between years t and t + 1; but it was simply missed in the
Yearbook for year t+ 1: To deal with such spurious exits, I use the following criterion. If a theater is observed
in year t but not in year t+ 1; I also check whether the theater is observed in years t+ 2 or t+ 3: If the theater
is not observed in both years, the theater is considered to have exited the market. If the theater is observed
again in either year t+ 2 or t+ 3 with exactly the same name and location as in year t, then it is considered
not to have exited in year t: Note that I also augment the data using the Yearbooks of 1956 and 1957 to deal
with spurious exits between 1954 and 1955.
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I assume that the di¤usion of TVs was the main driving force behind the decline in demand
for classic single-screen movie theaters. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008a) provide TV penetration
rates by county and year. The TV penetration rate is dened as the share of households which
have at least one TV set. This data are available for 1950, 1953, 1954, and 1955. To interpolate
and extrapolate TV di¤usion rates, for each market, I t the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of the Weibull distribution to nite data points and minimize the distance between
these points and the interpolated series by choosing two parameters. Thus, the TV penetration
rates are obtained for all t 2 [1949;1), and they are smooth and monotonically increasing
everywhere. Since I specify the theaters prot as a decreasing function of TV penetration,
this approach guarantees that the prot function satises Assumption 1-(i). Online Appendix
C provides the details of the interpolation method. 57 markets are dropped from the sample
because TV penetration rates are not observed in multiple years.
Basic demographic/market variables, obtained from the U.S. Census, also provide across-
market variations that will help to identify the theaterspayo¤ functions. Population deter-
mines the potential market size of a county. I assume that the median age, family income,
urban share, and employment share also shift demand. Counties are substantially di¤erent in
terms of geographic sizes, which may a¤ect the protability of theaters. To account for this,
I also include land area in the theaters payo¤ function. As I discuss in the next section, I
assume that these variables determine the base demand for theaters, which is market-specic
and constant over time.18 I also discard markets with missing covariates. Because of this, 44
markets were dropped from the sample.
Thus, for estimation, I am left with 2,606 markets, which have a total of 9,768 theaters in
1949.
4.2 Data Description
4.2.1 Market-Level State Variables
Table 1 shows the frequency of markets according to the initial number of competitors. There
are a lot of monopoly markets, which helps identify the theaters payo¤ function, as decisions
in such markets are a single-agent optimal stopping problem. The majority of markets have
few competitors in 1949, there are many duopoly and triopoly markets, and almost 80% of all
markets have ve competitors or fewer. Table 2 shows summary statistics for the market-level
variables that determine the base demand for theaters.
While these demographic variables shift the base demand, I assume that TV di¤usion,
18A regression analysis shows that these demographic variables can explain a substantial portion of the
cross-sectional variation in the number of theaters in 1949.
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population changes, and the entry of theaters a¤ect how demand for incumbent theaters
declines over time. The di¤usion process of TVs varies across markets. In 1950, in 87%
of the markets, TV penetration rates were lower than 10%. In 1955, however, the 5th and
95th percentiles of the TV penetration rate across markets were 14% and 86%, respectively,
indicating a wide variation in the di¤usion process across counties. This rich cross-section
and time-series variation in the TV penetration rate is the main source of identication of
theaterspayo¤ functions.19 In the estimation, I specify the decline in demand as a function
of the TV penetration rates.
The change in population during the sample period may a¤ect the decline in demand. The
5th, 25th, 75th, and 95th percentiles of the population change are -23.7%, -11.2%, 10.0%, and
40.7%, respectively. Because of these large population changes, it is important to control for
population growth when measuring declines in demand.
New theater entry is also assumed to a¤ect the decline in demand for incumbent theaters.
In 1,611 markets (61.8%), there was no entry in any year studied. In 641 markets (24.6%),
there was one entry. In the remaining 354 markets (13.6%), there was more than one entry
in the sample period. If I focus on markets with four competitors or fewer, in 90% of the
markets, the number of entries is one or fewer.
4.2.2 Exit Behavior
As shown in Figure 1, the number of indoor movie theaters decreased from 17,367 in 1949 to
11,335 in 1959 (a 34.7% decrease). During the sample period, 1,836 theaters (18.8% of the
sample) exited the market. In 1949, there were 3.75 theaters in the average market. Out of
these theaters, 3.66 theaters survived in 1950, 3.64 in 1951, 3.58 in 1952, 3.24 in 1954, and
3.04 in 1955. The standard deviation across counties decreased gradually and monotonically
from 2.34 in 1949 to 1.95 in 1955. This implies that markets with more competitors have
higher exit rates. Demand for movie theaters declined signicantly during this time period.
Looking at the aggregate statistics in Figure 1, attendance in the average movie theater per
year was 261,991 in 1949. This gure dropped to 184,571 in 1950, and it gradually decreased
to 163,689 in 1955.
Exit behaviors appear to be correlated with the initial market structure. Figure 3 plots the
exit rate in the sample period against the initial number of theaters. The exit rate increases
with the initial number of theaters, and is concave. About 9.5% of the sample exited in
monopoly markets, 13.7% in duopoly markets, and 15.1% in triopoly markets.
19I assume the di¤usion of TVs across households is exogenous. Alternatively, Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2008b) use the year in which each geographical market began receiving TV broadcasts as an instrument for
TV di¤usion across households.
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To further investigate the determinants of theatersexits, I regress the market-level exit
share (the share of theaters in each market that exited during the sample period) on the
change in the TV rate, the change in population, and the number of new entrants in the
market. The rst two columns of Table 4 show the result. The coe¢ cient of TV penetration
is positive, implying that the faster is the TV di¤usion in a county, the higher is the exit rate.
The negative coe¢ cient of change in population means that the inow of population slows
down the decline in demand, although it is not statistically signicant. The result also shows
that new entrants hasten theatersexits.
Strategic elements appear to be important in theatersexits. The second regression in-
cludes the number of theaters in 1949. To capture the non-linear e¤ect of market structure, I
also add its squared term. The linear term is positive, while the quadratic term is negative.
This implies that a market with more competitors has a higher exit rate, and that the incre-
ment in the exit rate becomes smaller as the number of theaters increases. This is consistent
with what I found in Figure 3.
One potential problem of this regression analysis is that the market structure may be
endogenous. If unobservable demand shifters that a¤ect the initial number of competitors
are correlated with unobservable declines in demand, then the coe¢ cients of the number of
competitors and its squared term would be inconsistent. To alleviate the endogeneity problem,
I run an instrumental variable (IV) regression. I use the demographic variables reported in
Table 2 as instruments for the number of competitors and its squared term, assuming that
these demographic variables are uncorrelated with unobservable decline in demand. The
results are reported in the last column of Table 4. Importantly, the signs of the number of
competitors and its squared term remain the same and statistically signicant. To conclude,
the market structure seems to have an important impact on theatersexit behaviors.
Theatersexits tend to be clustered within a market. Focusing on markets that experienced
at least two exits during the sample period, I calculated the interval between the rst and
second exit. In approximately 74% of these markets, the interval is shorter than two years.
On the contrary, only in 16% of these markets was the interval longer than three years. Such
clusters are observed even after controlling for observable variables.20 This observation points
to two things. First, there could be unobservable heterogeneity in the decline in demand. In a
market with severe decline in demand, theaters could exit shortly one after another. Second,
in a duopoly with asymmetric information, the rst exit is delayed while the second exit is
not, implying shorter intervals on average. In an N player game, this corresponds to the case
20For a simple check, I divide these markets into four groups based on the change in the TV penetration
rate. The share of markets within each group in which the interval between the rst and second exit is shorter
than two years ranges between 69% and 75%.
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in which the learning process is not fast, as discussed in Section 3.4. Thus, clustered exits in
the data are consistent with the theoretical model.
In the empirical analysis below, I assume that theaters are homogeneous in terms of observ-
able variables and are di¤erent from one another only in terms of unobservable and privately
known exit values for the following reasons. First, the capacity variable (the number of seats)
and the name of the street where a theater is located are frequently missing in my dataset.
In addition, information on chain stores is only partially observed. Second, the di¤erential
equation (1) that I use for estimation will be very complicated once I abandon the symmetry
assumption. This would make computation highly demanding. Thus, rather than a rm-level
analysis, this study may also be considered as a market-level analysis; e.g., how the initial
market structure and the exit process in the market are related.
5 Estimation Strategy
The theoretical model in Section 3 has two important advantages for estimation. First, the
uniqueness result in Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) is preserved in the N player game. Second,
the model is numerically tractable and easy to compute, as Section 3.4 illustrates. Thus,
I can use the full-solution approach (nested xed-point approach), as potential multiplicity
of equilibria and complexity of the game are two main obstacles to using the full-solution
approach in estimating multi-agent dynamic models.21 This enables me to explicitly take the-
atersexpectations, game history, and unobservable market-level heterogeneity into account.
Furthermore, given that the industry is still in a transition process during the sample period
(i.e., observed states are in the transient class), using the full-solution method is even more
important.22
I observe M independent markets and from this section on, I use a market subscript
m 2 f1; :::;Mg for all variables that di¤er across markets. For each market, I observe the
initial number of theaters nm; their exit times ft1; :::; tnmg with right censoring, the TV pene-
tration rate over time, and the set of market-level time-invariant variables that a¤ect market
protability and decline in demand. Note that, because of relatively short time periods in the
data, many independent repetitions of the game (markets) with the uniqueness property are
essential for inference.
21See Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010) for a discussion of these di¢ culties.
22To apply two-step methods, one should be able to estimate the conditional choice probability for every
state that the game could visit at some point in the future. This implies that, in the current application, one
has to extrapolate choice probabilities for states that have not been observed in the data. In addition, due
to learning, the current market structure is not su¢ cient to determine theatersstrategies. Therefore, using a
two-step method is practically infeasible in the current context.
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5.1 Specication
To solve the model numerically, I parameterize the payo¤ function. The specication and
selection of variables are guided by the data analysis in Section 4 and theoretical requirements.
Let n (t;m) be a theaters instantaneous prot in market m at time t; when n theaters stay
in the market. I assume that
n (t;m) = n (m)  d (t;m) ;
where n (m) is the base demand and d (t;m) is a function showing the decline in demand
(called decay functionhereafter).
The base demand is specied as
n (m) =
m + 
0Xm
nm
; (7)
where m is unobservable (to the econometrician) market-level heterogeneity, and Xm is a
vector of observable demographic variables, including a constant, population size, the median
age of the population, the median income, the share of the population living in urban areas,
the employment share of the population, and land size.  > 0 is a parameter that captures the
e¤ect of competition and guarantees that n (m) decreases in n.23 This specication captures
the idea that the change in prot when an additional theater is added depends on the original
size of demand. Since the market size di¤ers signicantly across markets, this dependence is
reasonable.24
Note that m plays an important role in theatersprot. Not all the determinants of movie
demand are likely observed by the econometrician. To see this, Table 3 splits markets into
several groups according to population size in 1950 and calculates the summary statistics of the
number of theaters in 1949. There is wide variation in the initial number of theaters among
similarly sized markets. Furthermore, even when I control for other observable covariates,
there still is variation in the initial number of theaters. Thus, it is important to account for
unobservable market-level heterogeneity.
I assume that d (t;m) decreases over time to satisfy Assumption 1 in Section 3 and is
specied as
d (t;m) = f1  1TVtmgexp(m+2POPm+3NEWm) ;
23I use a reduced-form prot function instead of fully specifying demand and cost functions. Demand for
di¤erentiated products is implicitly considered.
24Another possible specication would be
n (m) = m + 
0Xm +  log (nm) ;
where  is negative and the logarithm generates a decreasing e¤ect of competition. One problem for this
specication is that the amount of prot eroded by additional competitors is independent of market size.
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where TVtm is the TV penetration rate in marketm at time t; POPm is the growth rate of the
population in market m from 1950 to 1960,25 and NEWm is the total number of new entrants
in market m during the sample period. I restrict 0  1  1: Note that d (t;m) is between
zero and one, and decreases over time as long as TVtm is increasing in time. To rationalize
the observation that exit times are sometimes clustered, unobservable heterogeneity m is
introduced in the decay function. This specication is exible and potentially captures various
types of declines in demand. In later sections, the set of  is denoted by  = (1; 2; 3) :
I assume that theatersexit values identically and independently follow a truncated normal
distribution with mean ; variance 
2
; and lower and upper bounds of l and h; respectively.
I also assume that m (m) follows a normal distribution with mean  () and variance
2 (
2
). To allow for the possibility that a market with high unobservable demand shrinks
more slowly or quickly due to unobservable factors, m and m may be correlated with the
correlation coe¢ cient : For tractability, (m; m) are assumed to be ex-ante independent
of ; and all unobservable variables are ex-ante independent of Xm.
5.2 An Auxiliary Entry Model
I construct an auxiliary entry model and assume that potential entrants make their entry
decisions right before the war of attrition starts. I jointly estimate the entry model and the
exit game. There are two main advantages of doing so. First, as Table 1 shows, there are
substantial variations in the number of theaters in 1949. Since rm entry reveals protability,
I utilize the variation in the initial number of theaters to infer the parameters in the base
demand function (7).
Second, the entry model helps solve the initial conditions problem. If unobservable market
heterogeneity m a¤ected theatersprot before 1949, the number of theaters in 1949 and
market heterogeneity would be correlated through selection. Furthermore, rm-level unob-
servables, if they are serially correlated, introduce an additional source of endogeneity.26 In
other words, the initial competitors (incumbent rms in 1949) are a selected sample so the
distribution of exit values of incumbents is di¤erent from the population distribution. To solve
this initial conditions problem, I approximate the joint distribution of m and  conditional
on nm using the restrictions implied by the entry model. Then, I use this joint distribution to
solve the dynamic exit game. Online Appendix B provides a detailed discussion and procedure
of the proposed method.
The auxiliary entry model is based on Seim (2006). Specically, I assume that N potential
25I use demographic data from 1950 and 1960 because census data are available only every ten years.
26Unobservable time-invariant exit values in this paper are an extreme example of this with perfect serial
correlation.
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theaters decide simultaneously whether or not to enter the market at the beginning of 1949,
right before the war of attrition starts. Before making a decision, each player draws and
privately observes its own value of exit, i. If n theaters enter the market as a result of their
decisions, each entrant earns
en (m) =
m + 
0Xm
nem
:
On the other hand, if theater i does not enter, it earns i. Although I use the same form of
base demand as in (7), I allow the e¤ect of competition, e, to be di¤erent from  in the base
demand of the exit stage to capture the e¤ect of the Paramount Decree on competition.
Let Di = 1 if theater i enters the market and zero otherwise. Theater i enters if the
expected prot E [en (m)] is higher than i; so its optimal choice D

i is given by
Di = 1

(m + 
0Xm)E

n em
  i	 :
Letting P denote a theaters belief about the probability that an opponent enters the market,
it can be shown easily that E

n em

is simply a decreasing function of P , which is denoted by
K (P ) : The symmetric equilibrium belief P  (Xm; m) is thus given by a unique xed point
of the following equation:
P = G ((m + 
0Xm)K (P )) ; (8)
where G is the CDF of i:
The number of entrants predicted by this entry model equals the number of is in f1; :::;  Ng
that satisfy
(m + 
0Xm)K (P  (Xm; m))  i  0: (9)
Thus, for any pair (m;Xm) and realization of  = f1; :::;  Ng ; I can compute the equilibrium
number of entrants. Arguing backwards, for any pair of (Xm; nm); the entry model implies
the set of (m;) that is consistent with the pair. I use simulation to approximate the joint
distribution of (m;) conditional on (Xm; nm):
5.3 Identication and Estimator
The theoretical model was constructed in continuous time in order to exploit several convenient
properties of the model for estimation (uniqueness and ease of computation). On the other
hand, the data are discrete. Therefore, when aggregating over time, one wants to keep as
much of the power of the models identifying restrictions as possible.27
27For a discussion of several estimation issues in continuous-time models, see Arcidiacono, Bayer, Blevins,
and Ellickson (2012). See also Doraszelski and Judd (2010) for a discussion of tractability of continuous time
models.
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The intuition behind the identication of strategic delay is given by the following argument.
First, for the sake of argument, suppose that the e¤ect of competition is the same between the
exit and entry game; i.e.,  = e: The market structure before the war of attrition helps me
to infer how theaters interact in the product market. That is, the base demand is identied
from the entry stage. Next, using information on exits in monopoly markets in which strategic
interactions are absent, the decay function is identied. Then, with these components, exit
behaviors in markets with more than one theater are implied from the model without strategic
delays. In theory, any di¤erence between these implied exit behaviors and their empirical
counterparts is attributed to the strategic delay of exit. Next, assume that  6= e: In this
case, I need another source of information, as the di¤erence between the implied exit and
data mentioned above could also come from a di¤erent value of : Note that for a given
rate of decline in demand and exit rate during the entire sample period, how many exits
took place in the rst several years would be informative about the extent of strategic delay.
Therefore, by adding such information, I can separate the strategic delay in exit from the
e¤ect of competition ().
For estimation, I use indirect inference. I choose several moments that seemingly capture
the relevant features of the data. I simulate moments from the model and minimize the
distance between the simulated moments and data moments. I use moments jointly from the
dynamic exit game and from the entry game.
Let  be a set of structural parameters and  be a set of auxiliary parameters (moments)
that summarize certain features of the data. For any arbitrary moment x, I use x and x^
to denote the empirical and computed (from the model) moments, respectively. Thus, ^ ()
denotes the set of auxiliary parameters estimated from the simulated data. Note that I keep
the dependence of ^ on  explicit.
Several normalizations are necessary to identify the parameters of the model. First, lo-
cation normalization for prot is achieved by setting the means of unobservable market het-
erogeneity and exit values to zero,  =  = 0: The constant in  pins down the mean
prot. Next, I normalize the mean of unobservable heterogeneity in the decay function to
zero,  = 0; because in practice it is di¢ cult to identify it separately from the coe¢ cient of
the TV penetration rate 1. Finally, I set the variance of unobservable heterogeneity in the
decay function to one, 2 = 1; since it is not well identied empirically given that there are
a number of markets with no exit during the sample period. In sum, the set of structural
parameters to be estimated is  = (; e;;; ; ; ) :
Moment selection is guided by the theoretical model and data analysis in Section 4.2. The
restrictions implied by the entry model identify e; ; and : I use the average number of
entrants E (nm) and the average of interactions between nm and each of the demographic
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variables and its squared term in X: As was discussed above, there is additional variation in
the number of entrants after controlling for demographic variables. To capture this, V ar(nm)
is also added. The parameters in the decay function, , are identied mainly by the average
of market-level exit rates interacted with the TV penetration rate in 1955, the growth rate of
the population during the sample period, and the total number of new entrants.
The relationship between exit and the market structure at the beginning of the exit game
is informative about  and : The e¤ect of competition  determines how quickly prots
decrease in the number of active theaters, and hence a¤ects theatersexit. As is seen in Figure
3, the market-level exit rate and the initial number of theaters are positively correlated. This
aids identication of : On the other hand, a large market (which typically has large m
and nm) may have a di¤erent rate of decline in demand, which could slow down or speed up
theatersexit. This is captured by : Intuitively,  a¤ects the slope of the line in Figure 3,
while  a¤ects the curvature of the line. I add the following ten moments: the average of
market-level exit rates in monopoly markets, in duopoly markets, and in markets with nm = 3;
etc.
To capture the magnitude of asymmetric information and distinguish the current model
from the complete information benchmark, I use one additional moment. The rate of exit in
the rst three years of the sample period is calculated for each market and is denoted as the
rate of early exit. This variable, for given values of total exit rates and the decay function, is
expected to capture the magnitude of strategic waiting. I use the average of the rate of early
exit as an additional moment.
I have 28 moments to estimate 15 parameters. The elements in ^ () consist of the same
20 moments with the exit rates and the number of entrants being replaced by their simulated
counterparts. The indirect inference estimator ^ is given by
^ = arg min

(  ^ ())0
 (  ^ ()) ; (10)
where 
 is a positive denite weighting matrix.
The procedure to calculate the value of the objective function is as follows:
Step 1: Take a guess of structural parameters .
Step 2: Draw fnsgNSns=1 and fnsgNSns=1 independently from their distributions. Use (8)
and (9) to solve the entry game to calculate n^nsm for ns = 1; :::; NS and form n^m =
1
NS
PNS
ns=1 n^
ns
m : To solve the entry game, I set N = 11:
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Step 3 For Xm and nm; simulate F^;jXm;nm ; following the procedure in Online Appendix B.
28I set N at 11 arbitrarily, since the maximum number of actual entrants is ten in my sample.
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Step 4: Draw (ns; ns)NSns=1 randomly from F^;jXm;nm . For each simulation draw, calculate
the equilibrium of the dynamic game of exit:
 
tns1 ; :::; t
ns
nm
	NS
ns=1
:
Step 5: Calculate the rate of theatersexit for each market, denoted by e^nsm ; and form e^m =
1
NS
PNS
ns=1 e^
ns
m :
Step 6: Calculate moments ^ () and obtain the value of the criterion function
J () = (  ^ ())0
 (  ^ ()) :
Then, repeat Steps 1-6 to minimize J ().
The estimator ^ is consistent and the asymptotic distribution is
p
M(^   ) d ! N (0;W ) ; (11)
where W is given by
W =

1 +
1
NS

[H 0
H] 1H 0
 (E0) 
H [H 0
H] 1 ;
with H = @^ () =@ 0. An optimal weight matrix 
 = (E0) 1 is used so I have W = 
1 + 1
NS
 
H 0 (E0) 1H
 1
: For implementation, I bootstrap the data 1,000 times to get
fbg1;000b=1 ; and then calculate its variance-covariance matrix M : Then, I replace (E0) 1
and H with  1M and HM ; respectively.
6 Estimation Results
This section rst presents parameter estimates. Using these estimated parameters, I then
perform several counterfactual analyses.
6.1 Parameter Estimates
6.1.1 Base Demand
Table 5 presents estimates of the structural parameters. The coe¢ cient of population (1)
implies that theaters earn higher prots in bigger markets. The coe¢ cients of median age (2),
income (3), and land area (6) are all positive and signicant. One possible interpretation for
the coe¢ cient of urban share (4) is that once I control for other observable and unobservable
(to the econometrician) market characteristics, people living in urban areas are exposed to
various types of other entertainment. An interpretation of the coe¢ cient of employment
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share (5) could be that employed people have less time to watch movies. The parameters
that capture competition ( and e) suggest that a theaters prot is eroded by competition.
To see the relative sizes of these estimates, I calculate the value of base demand (7) at the
sample mean of X. Then, ^
0 X = 1:89. Duopoly and triopoly prots are 1:59 and 1:45; which
are about 15% and 23% lower than monopoly prots, respectively. In the entry stage, using
the same mean ^
0 X and a di¤erent competition e¤ect ^e; duopoly and triopoly prots are
19% and 29% lower than monopoly prots, respectively.
6.1.2 Decay Function
Table 5 reports the parameters in the decay function. The coe¢ cient of the TV rate (1) is
signicantly di¤erent from zero and is around 0.37. Since 1   1TVtm lies between zero and
one, a larger value in the exponential function means that the rate of decline in demand is
more severe. The coe¢ cient of population growth (2) is consistent with the intuition that
in a county with an outow of people, the decline in demand is faster. The coe¢ cient is not,
however, statistically signicant. The coe¢ cient of the number of theaters that entered after
1949 (3) is positive, implying that entry of a new competitor hastens the decline in demand
for incumbent theaters.
6.1.3 Estimates of Standard Deviations
Estimates of  and  are reported in Table 5. The standard deviation of exit values is
2.413 and is statistically signicant. This implies that 95% of theaters have an exit value
below 4.729. Meanwhile, the standard deviation of market-level heterogeneity is 0.035, which
means that 95% of the value of unobservable market heterogeneity is between -0.071 and 0.071.
Compared with the value of base demand (7) evaluated at the sample mean of X and the
estimated parameters (i.e., ^
0 X = 1:89), this variation explains a relatively minor proportion
of the variation in initial numbers of competitors among similarly sized markets.
The variance of exit values can be interpreted as the extent of asymmetric information.
If the variance is small, a theaters assessment about its competitors exit values is more
precise. Hence, if a theaters value of exit is signicantly higher than the mean, the theater
would give up and exit relatively earlier. As the previous paragraph suggests, the value of
exit varies widely, implying that theaters should stay in the market in the hope of outlasting
their competitors.
The estimate of  is imprecisely estimated and not signicantly di¤erent from zero. This
implies that the base demand and rate of decline in demand may still be correlated, but
the correlation can be captured by observable market-level variables. Indeed, the correlation
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between ^
0
Xm and ^2POPm + ^3NEWm is 0.15 and is statistically di¤erent from zero.
That is, given the TV penetration rate, a larger market would have a faster rate of decline in
demand on average.
6.2 Model Fit
To investigate the model t, I simulate the model ten times and for each simulation count
the number of markets in which the model predicts correctly the number of exits during the
sample period. Then, I take average over simulation draws for di¤erent market structures.
The model predicts the number of exits correctly in 83.3% of the monopoly markets. In
59.2% of duopoly or triopoly markets, the number of exits predicted by the model and the
one observed in the data match exactly. The corresponding number for markets with four or
ve theaters is 35.5%. Finally, in markets with more than ve theaters, the share of markets
in which the model predicts the number of exits correctly is 23.2%.
In addition, I randomly drew a set of structural parameters  from the estimated asymp-
totic distribution N (0;W ) given in (11) 200 times, and simulated the survival rate of theaters
for each draw. Then, I calculated the 95% condence interval (top 2.5% and bottom 2.5% of
exit rates) for the exit rates for di¤erent market structures. Figure 6 shows four graphs. The
model ts the data well, except for the survival rate in 1952 for markets with four or more
theaters in 1949. For most of the other years for other markets, the model shows a good t.
6.3 Simulation Analysis
6.3.1 Delay of Exit
To quantify the e¤ect of strategic interaction on the consolidation process, I dene two bench-
marks in relation to the war of attrition equilibrium. First, if exit values (xed costs) are
common knowledge, in equilibrium, any theater exits the game at the exact moment when
its prot becomes lower than its exit value.29 Thus, no theater incurs a loss.30 I call this the
complete information case. Second, since capacity reduction in a declining environment is a
public good that has to be provided privately, the exit process in a non-cooperative equilib-
rium does not maximize the industry prot. I consider a hypothetical industry regulator that
29Without private information, multiple equilibria may exist. I chose an equilibrium in which a theater with
the highest exit value exits rst.
30A loss or a negative prot in this context is in terms of economic prot. That is, if the prot of a theater
is lower than its exit value (the value of the outside option), I call this incur a loss or make a negative
prot.
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maximizes the industry prot. It would hasten the exit process in order to weaken business
stealing e¤ects and save xed costs. I call this the industry regulator case.
Let T  = ft1; :::; tNg and T  = ft1 ; :::; tN g be the vector of exit times in the complete
information benchmark and in a war of attrition equilibrium, respectively. The industry
regulator chooses a vector of exit times T = ft1; :::; tNg to maximize the industry prot:Z 1955
1949
ntX
k=1
[nt (t;m)  k] e rtdt
where nt is the number of theaters at time t implied by T = ft1; :::; tNg : Denote the regulators
solution by TR =

tR1 ; :::; t
R
N
	
: For any n;
 
tn   tRn

measures the delay in exit that arises from
oligopolistic competition. In an oligopoly with declining demand, rms have an incentive to
free-ride on competitorsexits/divestments, so the speed of capacity reduction is slower than
what the social planner would dictate. Meanwhile, (tn   tn) measures the delay in exit due
to asymmetric information. In the presence of asymmetric information about competitors
protability, rms have an incentive to wait, because when some of the competitors exit, their
prot would increase.
I compute (T ; T ; TR) for each market and calculate the average delay of the rst, second,
and third exits, as well as the average of all delayed exits. Table 6 summarizes the averages
according to the initial number of competitors. Note that some markets do not have any delay
during the sample period, so the averages are calculated only using markets in which delays
occur by the end of the sample period. The table also reports the share of such markets.
Overall, a theaters exit is delayed by 2.577 years due to oligopolistic competition, while
the delay in exit created by asymmetric information is 0.099 years. That is, 3.7% of the total
delay is accounted for by asymmetric information. The delay in exit di¤ers signicantly across
di¤erent market structures. In the case of duopoly, the exit is delayed by 2.22 years due to
oligopolistic competition, while asymmetric information delays exit by 0.154 years, implying
that 6.5% of the total delay is accounted for by asymmetric information.
The delay in exit becomes shorter as the game proceeds. For example, in markets with four
initial competitors, the rst exit is delayed by 3.107 years due to oligopolistic competition,
while the third exit is delayed by 0.729 years. The intuition is as follows. When the rst exit
occurs, three other theaters enjoy a higher prot. On the other hand, when the third exit
occurs, only one theater will have a higher prot. In addition, the xed cost that is saved
is higher for the rst exit than the third exit under the regulators solution. The delay due
to asymmetric information has the same features: the earlier exit is delayed more than later
exits. Consistent with the argument in Section 3.4, as time goes on, theaters learn more about
their competitors and the incentive to delay their exit becomes weaker.
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6.3.2 Cost of Strategic Interaction
Next, I compute the di¤erences in industry prots and costs of strategic interaction. Let fntg;
fnt g; and fnRt g be a sequence of the number of theaters in the market implied by T ; T ;
and TR; respectively. Using these, dene
Qm =
Z 1955
t
ntX
k=1

nt (t;m)  k

e rtdt (12)
Qm =
Z 1955
t
ntX
k=1

nt (t;m)  k

e rtdt (13)
QRm =
Z 1955
t
nRtX
k=1
h
nRt (t;m)  k
i
e rtdt (14)
where t denotes the moment when the rst exit occurs under the regulators solution. In
other words, these variables measure the cumulative prots that all surviving theaters in
market m earn in each scenario. The di¤erence in cumulative industry prots under the
complete information benchmark and the industry regulator case can be regarded as the cost
of oligopolistic competition. I use (QRm   Qm)=Qm to measure the cost. Meanwhile, the
di¤erence in cumulative industry prots under a war of attrition and complete information
can be regarded as the cost of asymmetric information. (Qm Qm )=Qm measures such costs.
Note that I use the same denominator to ease comparisons.
Table 7 summarizes these two statistics according to the initial number of competitors.
The cost of oligopolistic competition in the median market is 4.68%. The cost of asymmetric
information in the median market is relatively small (0.22%), and accounts for 4.5% of the total
cost. Overall, the loss of industry prot is larger in markets with fewer competitors. Above
all, the variation in the cost of asymmetric information across di¤erent market structures is
worthy of note. The di¤erence in the median duopoly market is 0.7%, which is more than three
times as big as the median market of all samples (0.22%). For a given player, the probability
of winning the war of attrition, i.e., the probability of being a monopolist, is highest in a
duopoly, and therefore theaters have the greatest incentive to wait. Moreover, the increment
of prot when one competitor exits is highest in duopoly, which also partly explains the big
di¤erence in the industry prot between the two cases. As the initial number of competitors
gets large, competition becomes closer to perfect competition, and hence motives to outlast
competitors become less signicant.
The cost of strategic interaction also di¤ers across markets with a di¤erent rate of decline
in demand. To see this, I split the sample into two groups of markets with slow and fast rates
of decline in demand according to the TV penetration rate in 1955. Table 8 summarizes the
average of each group according to the initial number of competitors. The cost of asymmetric
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information is largest in markets with slow rates of decline in demand. For example, in
duopoly markets, the median of the cost in the group of markets with slow declines in demand
is 0.83%, while the corresponding number for markets with fast declines in demand is 0.57%.
The intuition is as follows. In markets with slow declines in demand, the cost of waiting
increases slowly. On the other hand, the benet of waiting is still large because a winner of
the game can enjoy a higher prot over a longer time period. These two factors prolong the
war of attrition. On the contrary, interestingly, there is no clear pattern between markets in
which demand declines quickly and markets in which demand declines slowly in terms of the
cost of oligopolistic competition.
To further investigate the relationship between the decline in demand and the cost of
asymmetric information, I separate the e¤ect of the war of attrition from the e¤ect of declining
demand on the exit process. To do so, I x the TV penetration rate at its initial level in each
market so that the decay function is constant over time. As discussed in Section 3, theaters
expect a higher prot if they outlast their competitors and thus stay until the expected benet
of waiting becomes lower than the expected cost of waiting. As time goes on, theaters become
discouraged and exit if their competitors remain in the market. Notice that this dynamic
selection may occur even if demand is not declining.31 There are three types of theaters
in equilibrium. The rst set of theaters does not exit. Since demand is constant, their
instantaneous prots are forever higher than their values of exit. The second set of theaters
exits as soon as a war of attrition starts. They chose to enter the market in the static entry
game. Playing the exit game is, however, not protable for them, so they exit immediately.
The third set of theaters stays in the market for a while, in the hope that they will outlast their
competitors. Notice that this is due to asymmetric information. With complete information,
they would exit the market immediately.
Holding demand constant, I simulate the game 100 times for each market and focus on
theaters that exit the market. Table 9 averages the delay in exit due to asymmetric information
according to the initial number of competitors. As above, the average delay is larger in markets
with fewer competitors. In duopoly, the average delay is 1.841 years, which is signicantly
larger than the 0.154 years reported in Table 6. The constant demand prolongs the war of
attrition the most. An example of such a situation are battles to control new technologies
discussed by Bulow and Klemperer (1999), as demand in those industries is not declining.
Consequently, large losses accumulate over time.
31For example, the original game in Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) is mainly for the case of a growing industry.
The case of constant demand may be simply thought of as a special case of either a declining or growing market.
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7 Conclusion
Many industries face declining demand and consequently rms sequentially divest and exit
from the market. In an oligopolistic environment, strategic interaction plays an important
role and has a nontrivial impact on the consolidation process. Despite their importance in
the economy, economic costs of consolidation arising from strategic interactions have not been
studied su¢ ciently well. A suitable framework to analyze such a process would entail dynamic
and strategic players in a declining phase. This paper provides a tractable empirical framework
to achieve this goal.
Specically, I modify Fudenberg and Tirole (1986)s model of exit in duopoly with incom-
plete information to work in an oligopoly. I use data on the U.S. movie theater industry
and rich cross-section and time-series variations of TV penetration rates to estimate theaters
payo¤ functions and the distribution of exit values. By imposing the equilibrium condition,
the model predicts the distribution of theatersexit times for a given set of parameters and
unobservables. I use indirect inference and estimate the model parameters by matching the
predicted distribution with the observed distribution of exit times.
Using the estimated model, I measure strategic delays in the exit process due to oligopolis-
tic competition and incomplete information. The delay in exit that arises from strategic in-
teraction is 2.7 years on average. Out of these years, 3.7% is accounted for by incomplete
information, while the remaining 96.3% is explained by oligopolistic competition. I also nd
that the delay and its resulting cost are relatively large in markets with few competitors and
in markets with slow rates of decline in demand.
The framework in this paper can be applied to analyze other industries in which exogenous
decline in demand creates a non-stationary environment in an oligopoly. It should be empha-
sized that the prot lost in the war of attrition is not necessarily detrimental to society. Due
to delays in exit, consumers have access to more varieties if movie theaters are di¤erentiated
products. If demand-side data (price and quantity of the product) are available, one could
compare the increase in consumer surplus and decreased rmsprot due to the strategic
delay in exit. Applying this method to a currently declining industry is a useful exercise.
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Number of
Theaters in 1949
Frequency Percent
1 451 17.31
2 520 19.95
3 445 17.08
4 369 14.16
5 245 9.40
6 209 8.02
7 143 5.49
8 87 3.34
9 80 3.07
10 57 2.19
Total 2,606 100.00
Table 1: Number of Competitors.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Population 2,606 22,791 19,627 1,870 194,182
Median age 2,606 4.09 1.03 1.00 7.00
Median family income 2,606 4.91 1.57 0.00 9.00
Urban share 2,606 0.24 0.23 0.00 0.95
Employment share 2,606 0.96 0.02 0.81 1.00
Land area (square miles) 2,606 967 1,289 25 18,573
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Demographic Variables in 1950.
Note: Median age and median family income are categorical variables.
Source: Hanes, Michael R., and the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research
HISTORICAL, DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL DATA: THE UNITED STATES,
1790-2000.
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Population of
counties
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
0-10,000 648 2.0 1.1 1 7
10,000-20,000 863 3.0 1.6 1 9
20,000-30,000 473 4.2 1.9 1 10
30,000-40,000 258 5.4 2.2 1 10
40,000-50,000 161 6.2 2.1 1 10
50,000-75,000 129 7.2 1.8 2 10
75,000-100,000 49 8.0 1.7 5 10
100,000-150,000 23 8.3 1.2 6 10
150,000+ 2 8.0 1.4 7 9
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Number of Theaters in 1949 by Population Size.
Source: Authors calculation based on the population data used in Table 2 and theatersdata from
The Film Daily Yearbook of Motion Pictures.
OLS OLS IV Regression
Parameters Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err
Constant 0.0845 0.0114 0.0200 0.0163 -0.2272 0.0541
nm in 1949 - - 0.0365 0.0071 0.1907 0.0323
(nm in 1949)2 - - -0.0025 0.0007 -0.0193 0.0033
Change TV rate 0.1229 0.0216 0.0813 0.0222 0.0729 0.0262
Change in population -0.0229 0.0227 -0.0382 0.0226 -0.0369 0.0251
New entrants 0.0706 0.0088 0.0604 0.0089 0.0612 0.0100
Adjusted R2 0.0350 0.0533 0.0598
Table 4: Preliminary Evidence.
Note: The dependent variable is the share of theaters in each market that exit during the sample
period. For the IV regression, I use demographic variables in Table 2 as instruments for the initial
number of competitors and its squared term. The p-value for the F statistic in the rst stage is
0.0000 for both regressions.
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Parameters Coef. Std. Err
 (competition in dynamic game) 0.2416 0.0362
e (competition in entry game) 0.3121 0.0167
0 (constant) 0.8744 0.0221
1 (population) 7.4122 0.2179
2 (median age) 1.9634 0.0997
3 (median income) 0.8300 0.0186
4 (urban share) -0.3939 0.0118
5 (employment share) -3.4959 0.0282
6 (log of land area) 2.4158 0.1060
1 (TV rate) 0.3715 0.0175
2 (change in population) -0.2220 0.7917
3 (new entrants) 0.5137 0.0945
 (std. of exit value) 2.4130 0.0901
 (std. of demand shifter) 0.0354 0.0049
 (corr coef. b/w m and m) -0.1892 0.1323
Table 5: Estimates of Structural Parameters.
t   tR t   t
Market s Mean 1st 2nd 3rd s Mean 1st 2nd 3rd
nm = 2 0.39 2.220 2.220 - - 0.20 0.154 0.154 - -
nm = 3 0.60 2.587 2.967 1.265 - 0.31 0.120 0.126 0.102 -
nm = 4 0.74 2.483 3.107 1.759 0.729 0.42 0.107 0.118 0.093 0.085
All markets 0.68 2.577 2.984 2.248 1.498 0.38 0.099 0.112 0.084 0.073
Table 6: Delay in Exit in Years.
Note: Let tR, t, and t be the exit time in the the regulator benchmark, in the complete information
benchmark, and in a war of attrition equilibrium, respectively. s is the share of markets in which
delays occur during the sample period. I calculate the average delay of the rst, second, and third
exits, as well as the average of all delayed exits by the initial number of competitors.
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 
QRm  Qm

=Qm (Q

m  Qm ) =Qm
Market Mean 5th Median 95th Mean 5% 50% 95%
nm = 2 8.21% 2.23% 7.22% 16.42% 0.99% 0.17% 0.70% 2.83%
nm = 3 5.67% 2.57% 5.34% 10.18% 0.37% 0.07% 0.30% 0.91%
nm = 4 4.76% 2.42% 4.56% 8.19% 0.27% 0.04% 0.23% 0.63%
All markets 5.40% 2.06% 4.68% 11.25% 0.39% 0.05% 0.22% 1.17%
Table 7: Cost of Oligopolistic Competition and Asymmetric Information.
Note: Let QRm, Q

m, and Q

m be the total cumulative prot earned by all theaters in market m in
the regulator benchmark, in the case of complete information, and in a war of attrition, respectively.
This table shows the summary statistics of these variables by the initial number of competitors.
 
QRm  Qm

=Qm (Q

m  Qm ) =Qm
Market Slow Fast Slow Fast
nm = 2 7.25% 7.21% 0.83% 0.57%
nm = 3 5.29% 5.35% 0.39% 0.23%
nm = 4 4.61% 4.46% 0.27% 0.17%
All markets 4.44% 5.09% 0.24% 0.20%
Table 8: Cost of Strategic Interaction and Decline in Demand.
Note: QRm, Q

m, and Q

m are dened in the same way as in Table 7. The table shows the value of the
median market for each market structure and speed of decline in demand.
t   t
Market Mean 5th Median 95th
nm = 2 1.841 0.144 1.059 5.342
nm = 3 1.593 0.002 0.908 5.412
nm = 4 1.623 0.002 1.232 4.802
All markets 1.059 0.002 0.303 4.568
Table 9: Delay in Exit in Years when Demand is Constant.
Note: t and t are dened in the same way as in Table 6. I calculate the model 100 times in each
market assuming demand is constant, and average the delay in exit due to asymmetric information
by the initial number of competitors. Approximately one-third of the exits occur immediately.
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Figure 1: Movie Attendance and Number of Movie Theaters
Note: Movie theater yearly attendance and the total number of indoor movie theaters.
Source: The Film Daily Yearbook of Motion Pictures.
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Figure 3: Exit Rate by Number of Competitors in 1949
Source: Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008a).
Source: The Film Daily Yearbook of Motion Pictures and author's calculation.
Figure 2: Average of Market-Level TV Penetration Rates
Note: These rates are not reported in 1951 and 1952.
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Note: I randomly drew a set of structural parameters γ from the estimated asymptotic distribution N(0,W) 200 times, and simulated the survival rate of 
theaters for each draw. Then, I calculated the 95% confidence interval (top 2.5% and bottom 2.5% of exit rates) for the exit rate for different market 
structures.
0.7
0.75
0.8
1949 1950 1951 1952 1954 1955
0.7
0.75
0.8
1949 1950 1951 1952 1954 1955
Appendix A: Proofs (Online Appendix, Not for
Publication)
Claim Consider a two-player game. Pick  arbitrarily such that  > limt!12 (t) : Let
T
 
2; 0; ;  be the equilibrium strategy of the game if the two-player subgame starts at
t = 0: Let 
 
t; 2; 0; 

be its inverse. For any t0 such that 0 < t0 < T
 
2; 0; ; 

;
let eT (2; t0;e; ) denote the equilibrium strategy of the game starting from t0: Also lete(t; 2; t0;e) be its inverse. Then, e =   t0; 2; 0;  and T  2; 0; ;  = eT (2; t0;e; ) for
all   e:
In other words, the optimal exit time that is planned at time zero equals the one that is
planned at some later time, conditional on nobody having exited until then.
Proof of Claim In equilibrium, at time t0; theater i knows that j is equal to or smaller
than 
 
t0; 2; 0; 

: If not, theater j would have been better o¤ by exiting at t0   ";
which contradicts the construction of 
 
t0; 2; 0; 

: Thus, e =   t0; 2; 0;  : If theater i
chooses stopping time   t0; the present discounted sum of its expected prots at t0 is
V ( ; eT i; 2; t0;e; i) = Pr(eT (2; t0;e; j)  ) Z 
t0
n (t) e
 r(t t0)dt+
i
r
e r( t0)

+
Z
fj jeT (2;t0;e;j)<g
"Z eT (2;t0;e;j)
t0
n (t) e
 r(t t0)dt
+e r(
eT (2;t0;e;j) t0)V (eT ; 1; eT (2; t0;e; j);e0; i)i g(jjj  e)dj:
Taking the rst-order condition and rearranging gives
e0(t; 2; t0;e) =  G(e(t; 2; t0;e)jj  e)
g(e(t; 2; t0;e)jj  e)
" e(t; 2; t0;e)  2 (t)
V (eT ; 1; t; e(t; 2; t0;e); e(t; 2; t0;e))  e(t; 2; t0;e)=r
#
=  G(
e(t; 2; t0;e))
g(e(t; 2; t0;e))
" e(t; 2; t0;e)  2 (t)
V (eT ; 1; t; e(t; 2; t0;e); e(t; 2; t0;e))  e(t; 2; t0;e)=r
#
:
(A1)
where the second equality follows from G(
e(t;2;t0;e)jje)
g(e(t;2;t0;e)jje) = G(e(t;2;t0;e))g(e(t;2;t0;e)) : The boundary
condition is e(t0; 2; t0;e) = (t0; 2; 0; ): (A2)
Since (1) and (A1) are the same, (A2) implies
e(t; 2; t0;e) = (t; 2; 0; ) 8t  t0:
Equivalently, T
 
2; 0; ; 

= eT (2; t0;e; ) for all     t0; 2; 0;  :
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Proof of Lemma 2 (i) Arbitrarily pick  2 n 1 (0) ;  : Suppose Ti(n; sn;en; ) > 0: Then,
 is the marginal type at t = Ti(n; sn;en; ) that is indi¤erent between exiting at t and
exiting at (t + dt). The value of waiting until (t + dt) is the probability that one of
is opponents drops out in [t; t+ dt] conditional on it having survived until t; times the
value of entering the n  1 player subgame. On the other hand, the cost of waiting until
(t + dt) is f(   n (t)) dtg ; which is positive because   n 1 (0) > n (0) > n (t).
Since the value should be equal to the cost of waiting by assumption of the marginal
type, the value of entering the n  1 player subgame should be positive as well.
If one of the competitors, say j; drops out in the interval, theater s value of entering
the subgame depends on the exit values of other surviving competitors. Since  is
the marginal type at Ti(n; sn;en; ); however, it follows that Pr ( < k) = 0 for any
competitor k: Otherwise, player k should have dropped out earlier. This implies that
player  drops out immediately after the two-player subgame starts. Therefore, the value
of staying for theater  should be zero. This is a contradiction.
(ii), (iii), (iv) By the same argument as Lemma 1 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1986).
Proof of Lemma 3 (i) The value of exit of surviving theaters is  or lower. Therefore,
n (t) is higher than the value of exit for any theater until t; and hence no theater will
exit between sn and t:
(ii), (iii), (iv) By the same argument as Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 5 In the symmetric case, a slight modication of the proof for Lemma
3 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) su¢ ces. In particular, letting (t;n; sn;en) ande(t;n; sn;en) be distinct solutions of (1), (2), and (3), I can obtain a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 6 A theater with i = (t;n; sn;en) does not drop out if n (t) is
strictly larger than its exit value. If n (t) = (t;n; sn;en); the theater does not drop
out either, because there is a positive probability that some of its competitors exit in
the next instant; i.e.,
Pr((t;n; sn;en) < max
j 6=i
fjg < (t+ s;n; sn;en)) > 0
for all t and s > 0: Thus, n (t) < (t;n; sn;en): Next, to show that (t;n; sn;en) <
n 1 (t) ; suppose (t;n; sn;en) = n 1 (t). A theater with i = n 1 (t) is indi¤erent
between staying in and exiting. By Assumption 1, however, there is always a posi-
tive probability that every theater stays in; i.e., Pr(max fjgj 6=i < limt!1n (t)) > 0.
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Therefore, theater i = n 1 (t) would be better o¤ by dropping out at t   ": This
contradicts the construction of (t;n; sn;en): Thus, (t;n; sn;en) < n 1 (t) :
Appendix B: Initial Conditions Problem (On-
line Appendix, Not for Publication)
Formally, letting fY (yjz) be the joint density of Y 2 RK conditional on Z = z, the initial
conditions problem suggests that
f; (; jX; n) 6= f; (; jX) ;
where n is the observed number of theaters in 1949 and X is a set of observable market
covariates. In addition, by assumption, we have
f; (; jX) = f (jX) f (jX)
but
f; (; jX; n) 6= f (jX; n) f (jX; n) :
Thus, I need to obtain f; (; jX; n) ; which is generated endogenously from the game before
1949 in order to calculate the likelihood function or to simulate moments of the dynamic game
of exit. One way to address this issue is to simulate the model starting from the time when the
industry was born, and infer the distributions of  and  that are consistent with the industry
structure in 1949. The movie theater industry, however, had a non-stationary structure in
the sense that it experienced a boom in the 1920s and 1930s, and afterwards faced declining
demand in the 1950s. Therefore, simulating the entire history of the industry requires one to
model the life cycle of the industry, which is beyond the scope of the paper.
Instead, I approximate f; (; jX; n) by simulation as follows. I assume that N potential
players play an entry game at time zero (in 1949 in my model), and entrants play the exit
game afterwards. Specically, each potential entrant draws its value of exit, and by comparing
it with the expected value of entry, it chooses whether or not to enter the market. For a given
value of market heterogeneity and set of exit values of all potential entrants, the entry game
predicts the number of entrants in equilibrium. Since the initial number of theaters is observed,
I use the entry game to restrict the support of market heterogeneity and exit values so that,
in equilibrium, the entry game predicts the same number of entrants as is observed. Since it
is hard to characterize such a restriction analytically, I use a simulation to approximate the
joint distribution of market heterogeneity and exit values, conditional on the observed number
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of entrants. This simulated distribution can then be used as an input to simulate and solve
the dynamic stage of the game.
My approach can be regarded as a reduced form of a full simulation of the entire history of
the industry. Heckman (1981) proposes introduction of an additional reduced-form equation
to account for the potential correlation between the initial state of a sample and unobservable
heterogeneity, and jointly estimates the model with the additional equation. Thus, the current
approach can also be regarded as an extended version of Heckman (1981)s model in the
context of games with serially correlated private information. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007)
also account for the initial conditions problem associated with market-level unobservables, but
in their context private information is iid over time and thus players are not selected samples
in that aspect.
To begin, I make the following assumption:
Assumption All potential players make an entry decision simultaneously at time zero without
knowing that a war of attrition will immediately follow the entry game. That is, every
player assumes that, upon entry, it earns the same per-period payo¤ forever.
I use en (m) as the payo¤ from entering the game when n theaters do so. The above
assumption justies this. If theaters expect that a war of attrition will start or payo¤s will
change sometime in the future, then computing the value of entry is a lot more complicated.
Remember that theater is optimal choice Di is given by
Di = 1

(m + 
0Xm)E

n em
  i	
= 1

(m + 
0Xm)
X N 1
k=0
Pr (nm; i = k) (k + 1)
 

 i

(1)
where N is the number of potential entrants and nm; i is the number of entrants aside from i.
Let P denote a theaters subjective probability that a competitor enters the market. By the
binomial theorem, we have
Pr (nm; i = k) =
 N   1
k

P k (1  P ) N k 1 :
Finally, (1) implies
Pr (Di = 1) = G

(m + 
0Xm)
X N 1
k=0
 N   1
k

P k (1  P ) N k 1 (k + 1) 

:
In equilibrium, the beliefs are consistent with the strategies, meaning that
P = G ((m + 
0Xm)K (P )) (2)
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where
K(P ) =
X N 1
k=0
 N   1
k

P k (1  P ) N k 1 (k + 1)  :
Letting P  (Xm; m) denote the unique xed point of (2), the number of entrants predicted
by this entry model equals the number of is in f1; :::;  Ng that satisfy
(m + 
0Xm)K (P  (Xm; m))  i  0: (3)
B.1: Simulating the Joint Distributions of  and s
This subsection explains how the entry model is used to approximate the joint distributions of
 and  conditional onX and n. Let F; (; jX;n) be the CDF of the density f; (; jX;n).
Based on the entry model, I simulate the joint distribution of  and  conditional on (Xm; nm)
in the following way:
Step 1: Draw 0 from N (0; 2) :
Step 2: Calculate P  (Xm; 0) using (2). Then, dene  as
 =
 
0 + 0Xm

K
 
P 
 
Xm; 
0

:
That is,  is the threshold of exit values below which a theater nds it protable to
enter the game.
Step 3: Draw a value of exit nm times from TN (0; 2; l; 
) and N nm times from TN (0; 2; ; h) ;
where TN(; 2; a; b) denotes the truncated normal distribution with mean ; variance
2; and lower and upper bounds of a and b. Sort these values in an ascending order.
Call them 0 =
 
01; :::; 
0
nm ; 
0
nm+1; :::; 
0
N

:
Step 4: Dene l and h such that
0nm = (l + 
0Xm)K (P  (Xm; l))
0nm+1 = (h + 
0Xm)K (P  (Xm; h)) :
Step 5: Draw 1 from TN (0; 2;l; h) :
That is, 1 is large enough to support entry of nm theaters but not enough to support entry
of nm + 1 theaters.
Step 6: Return to Step 2 and repeat these steps J times to get
 
j; j
J
j=1
:1 Call this
F^;jXm;nm :
Note that this procedure is completed for each market. Any random draw (; ) from
F^;jXm;nm supports exactly nm entrants in a symmetric equilibrium of the entry game.
1I discard the rst 30 sets of
 
j ; j

before storing.
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B.2: Role of Initial Conditions
If a market has a high unobservable demand shifter, we would observe more rms in the
market than otherwise. If one were to ignore the unobservables in such a case, one would
underestimate the negative e¤ect of competition, since many rms appear to be able to operate
protably. On the other hand, if the unobservable demand shifter is low, the number of
competitors would be small. In such a case, one would infer that the e¤ect of competition
is strong. Furthermore, ignoring the initial conditions problem a¤ects estimates of other
parameters as well.
To see the role of the initial conditions problem, I estimate the model using the ex-ante
distributions of market level heterogeneity and exit values; i.e., I use F;jnm instead of F^;jnm :
Note that the entry stage is used only for identifying the parameters in the payo¤ function.
I have 27 moments to estimate 15 parameters.2 Table 1 shows the parameter estimates.
The e¤ect of competition in the dynamic game, ; is estimated to be smaller than the full
model, while that in the entry game, e, is larger. Thus, ignoring the initial conditions
problem signicantly changes estimates of competition e¤ects. The estimates of the variance
of market-level heterogeneity are also di¤erent between the two specications.
To investigate the model t, I simulate the model ten times and for each simulation count
the number of markets in which the model predicts correctly the number of exits during the
sample period. Then, I take average over simulation draws for di¤erent market structures.
The model predicts the number of exits correctly in 83.3% of the monopoly markets. In
59.5% of duopoly or triopoly markets, the number of exits predicted by the model and the
one observed in the data match exactly. The corresponding number for markets with four or
ve theaters is 34.0%. Finally, in markets with more than ve theaters, the share of markets
in which the model predicts the number of exits correctly is 23.0%.
It is di¢ cult, however, to evaluate the importance of initial conditions, since parameters
in the payo¤ function are reduced-form parameters.3 To better understand the role of initial
conditions, I rst simulate the model starting from 1949 until 1955, using the ex-ante distri-
2Compared to the full model, the average number of entrants E(nm) is excluded from the set of moments
for the following reason. Since the mean of m is ex-ante zero, the exit game predicts too many exits at t = 0
for markets with many competitors, unless the mean prot is very high. If the mean prot is high, however,
the entry stage predicts too many entrants.
3Another reason is that I use the entry model not only for addressing the initial condition problem but
also for identifying parameters in the base demand. One alternative would be to identify all the parameters
from dynamicmoments only, and to use the entry model only for addressing the initial condition problem.
Then, I would be able to compare the estimation results with and without the entry model. I did not use
this strategy because the correlations between exit rates and Xm are weak in the data, and thus I would not
identify  in the base demand well.
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bution of unobservables.4 To x observable variables, I only use Steuben county in Indiana
for the simulation, as the TV penetration rate in 1955 and the total population in 1950 are
close to the median values in the sample.5 Then, I assume 1955 is the initialperiod of my
hypothetical sample. Put di¤erently, I assume that the industry was born in 1949 and the
data are available from 1955. Panel (a) in Figure B1 plots the distribution of market-level
heterogeneity () conditional on the number of surviving theaters in 1955. This result clearly
shows that f (jX; n) 6= f (jX) : Next, I simulate F^;jXm;nm using the simulation method
proposed above, and integrate over  to calculate f^ (jX; n) for n = 3: Panel (b) in Figure
B1 plots this and compares it with the true distribution of  conditional on n = 3, which I
already showed in panel (a), along with the ex-ante distribution of : The truedistribution
of  is closer to the simulated distribution than to the ex-ante distribution.
Since unobservable exit values are time-invariant, selection based on exit values may be
substantial too. In panel (c) in Figure B1, I plot the distribution of exit values when the
industry was born in this exercise (i.e., ex-ante distribution) and the distribution of exit values
of surviving theaters in 1955. As expected, these two distributions are signicantly di¤erent
from one another. In particular, the distribution of survivorsexit values has a high density
at the low end compared to the unconditional distribution. I also calculated f^ (jX; n = 3)
for surviving theaters in 1955, using the proposed simulation method. Panel (c) plots this
distribution. Again, the simulated distribution is closer to the true distribution of exit values
of surviving theaters. Although these two distributions are still di¤erent, it can be seen that
the proposed method, to some extent, alleviates the initial conditions problem.
One caveat is that in this exercise the game played by the theaters before the initial
period (i.e., 1955) is the exit game in which the payo¤ function is very similar to that of the
entry game. As I discussed above, in the current application, the type of game that was played
before 1949 may have been di¤erent from the exit game. If the game before the initial period
were, however, di¤erent, the parameter estimates in the entry game would change accordingly,
and hence be able to capture the correlation between n; ; and :
4Throughout this exercise, I x 2 = 0:6 to facilitate comparisons. Other parameters are set at the
estimated values.
5The TV penetration rate in 1955 and the total population in 1950 of Steuben county are 0.54 and 17,087,
respectively. The median value for each variable is 0.54 and 17,150, respectively. The number of theaters in
1949 in this county was three in the data, but I start from four theaters to have more variations in the number
of theaters in 1955.
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Appendix C: Interpolation of TV Penetration Rates (On-
line Appendix, Not for Publication)
The TV penetration rate is reported once in 1950 and afterwards every year starting from
1953. I use data from all available years up to 1960 to approximate the TV di¤usion process
by the CDF of the Weibull distribution. For market m; I observe
(TVm1950; TVm1953; TVm1954; :::; TVm1960) :
Using 1949 as the reference year, let
dTV mt (k1; k2) = 1  e ((t 1949)=k1)k2 :
Then, I choose (k1; k2) to minimizeX
t=1950;1953;:::;1960
(TVmt  dTV mt (k1; k2))2
for each market. Once the minimizers are obtained, I can calculate dTV mt(k^1; k^2) for all
t 2 [1949; 1955] :
This approach has several advantages. First, the interpolated TV penetration rate is
continuous and smooth. Linear interpolation would generate many kinks, which may not be
natural in the continuous-time model. Second, this method ensures that the theaters payo¤
is monotonic, which satises Assumption 1 (i). In 84 markets (about 3% of all markets), the
TV penetration rate decreases slightly from one year to another. This is most likely due to
mis-measurement. I do not need to discard these observations. Third, this method enables
me to exploit information after 1955. Given that the TV penetration rate is missing in 1951
and 1952, such additional information is valuable.
Appendix D: Importance of Movie Theater Chains (On-
line Appendix, Not for Publication)
Movie theater chains existed in the sample period, although their inuence and market power
were much more limited compared to later periods. Unfortunately, comprehensive information
on movie theater chains in the time period of this study is not available. The Film Daily
Yearbook of Motion Pictures, however, lists all theaters owned by big theater chains (circuits);
i.e., theater chains that own at least four theaters in the U.S. I collect markets in which at least
two movie theaters are owned by the same theater chain and call them market with circuit.
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The remaining markets are called market without circuit. In other words, in these markets,
any two theaters in the market are not owned by the same theater chain. It could still be the
case that two theaters are owned by two di¤erent chains. Table 2 shows the frequency of these
markets. The majority of markets do not have a circuit that owns more than one theater in
the same market.
To further investigate if this may distort my results, I construct a dummy variable dened
as whether the market is a market with circuit or not, and regress the market-level exit
rate on the dummy variable as well as on the initial number of competitors, its squared term,
the change in the TV rate, the change in the population, and the number of new entrants in
the market. The sign of the coe¢ cient of the dummy variable is positive, but not statistically
signicant. If theaters under the same ownership coordinate, there would be no strategic delay
and the exit rate would be higher. In this sense, the sign of the coe¢ cient is consistent with
the argument that competition delays exits. There is no evidence, however, that market with
circuitsignicantly distort the result. This should not be taken as evidence that chains are not
important, as (i) this additional data contain only big theater chains, and (ii) the explanatory
power of the linear regression is limited. Rather, the delay and cost of asymmetric information
in this paper can be interpreted as their lower bounds, as coordination would hasten exits.
Appendix E: Numerical Solution (Online Appendix, Not
for Publication)
To solve this di¤erential equation, the method of forward shooting cannot be used because the
problem is ill-dened at zero. The standard backward-shooting method does not work either,
as a nite end point does not exist. To deal with this issue, I apply the following algorithm.
I start from an arbitrary point t0 > 0 and use backward shooting from t0 to 0: Then, I choose

 
t0;n; 0; 

such that (0;n; 0; ) = n 1 (0) : Then, for an arbitrary " > 0; I conrm that
there exists t00 such that j(t00;n; 0; )  n (t00) j < ":
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Parameters Coef. Std. Err
 (competition in dynamic game) 0.2009 0.1050
e (competition in entry game) 2.1173 0.2285
0 (constant) 8.7248 1.8764
1 (population) 0.0687 4.3860
2 (median age) 2.5228 1.5975
3 (median income) 0.0206 4.0410
4 (urban share) -2.5481 1.1484
5 (employment share) 2.7038 1.0338
6 (log of land area) -2.7572 1.3948
1 (TV rate) 0.5487 0.0596
2 (change in population) -3.3260 0.8608
3 (new entrants) 0.4326 0.1257
 (std. of exit value) 2.7545 0.5959
 (std. of demand shifter) 1.8622 0.5057
 (corr coef. b/w m and m) 0.3320 0.0861
Table 1: Estimates of Structural Parameters without Correcting the Initial
Condition Problem.
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Number of
Theaters in 1949
Market with
Circuit
Market w/o
Circuit
Total
1 0 451 451
2 124 396 520
3 160 285 445
4 174 195 369
5 138 107 245
6 123 86 209
7 111 32 143
8 72 15 87
9 64 16 80
10 46 11 57
Total 1,012 1,594 2,606
Table 2: Number of Markets With and Without Circuit.
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Panel (b): Ex-ante, Actual and Simulated Distributions of Market-Level Heterogeneity when n=3 
Ex‐ante Actual Simulated
2
Panel (c): Ex-ante, Conditional (on survival), and Simulated Distribution of Exit Values
Figure B1 Importance of Initial Condition Problem
Note: I simulate the model many times starting from 1949 until 1955, using the ex-ante distributions of unobservables. 
I fix observable covariates at the level of the median county. Panel (a) plots the distribution of market-level 
heterogeneity, splitting the simulated outcomes according to the number of surviving theaters in 1955. Then, 
assuming that 1955 is the initial period of my hypothetical sample, I simulate the distribution of market-level 
heterogeneity for n=3, using the method I discribed in Section B.1. Penel (b) plots the resulting distribution and the 
distribution conditional on n=3 from panel (a), along with its ex-ante  distribution. Finally, panel (c) plots the ex-ante , 
conditional (on survival in 1955), and simulated distributions of exit values, which I obtained from the above 
simulation.
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